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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20010809-SC 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant asserts that "[t]he judge in this case was the only Third District Court 
judge who routinely sentenced defendants in absentia when they did not appear at 
sentencing." Br. Respondent at 2 n.l; see id. at 19-20. This allegation is based on 
speculation and is without support in the record or in publicly available documents. 
Defense counsel points to a number of cases where this judge sentenced defendants in 
absentia. Nothing in the record, however, indicates whether this judge routinely 
sentenced defendants in absentia or whether he sometimes sentenced defendants in 
absentia, but sometimes did not. Nothing suggests with what regularity other judges 
sentenced defendants in absentia. All that is known—information from court decisions 
that have been made public—is that this judge sentenced several defendants in absentia 
and they appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LA. 
A DEFENDANT ABSENT WITHOUT EXPLANATION AFTER 
RECEIVING NOTICE OF HIS HEARING MAY BE PRESUMED 
VOLUNTARILY ABSENT 
A. Utah precedent supports a presumption of voluntariness. The court of appeals 
erred in holding that an unexplained absence must be presumed involuntary. 
Defendant argues that "the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial 
court erred in presuming that [defendant's] absence was voluntary/' Br. Respondent at 9. 
Defendant argues that the court's "decision is based on precedent." Id. 
Defendant relies primarily on State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986), a trial-in-
absentia case, where the appellate court held that a defendant's absence was not 
voluntary. Like defendant, Houtz failed to appear. In Houtz's case, however, unlike 
defendant's, a reason for Houtz's absence was presented to the trial court. When Houtz 
did not appear, the prosecutor, who had learned that Houtz had been arrested in 
California, conveyed this information to the trial court. Id. at 678. The trial court, 
nevertheless, determined that Houtz's absence was voluntary because Houtz "had left 
Utah in violation of his bail." Id. at 678. This Court reversed, holding that "a defendant 
in custody... is not free to make a voluntary decision about whether or not he will attend 
court proceedings.'* Id. 
Houtz is therefore inapposite. The issue here is whether a court may presume that 
a defendant, who is absent without explanation after receiving notice of his sentencing 
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hearing, may be presumed voluntarily absent. Houtz's absence was not without 
explanation. Where voluntariness "is determined by considering the totality of the 
circumstances," the totality in Houtz's case included an explanation for his absence, i.e., 
incarceration. No similar circumstance is present here. 
Defendant's also attempts to distinguish three Utah cases cited in the State's 
opening brief—State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), State v. Myers, 508 P.2d 
41 (Utah 1973), and State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1989). Each case, 
however, involved a defendant who had actual or constructive notice of a proceeding but 
neither appeared nor proffered any explanation at the time of the proceeding or thereafter. 
In each of these cases, the appellate court affirmed a trial court's finding that the 
defendant had voluntarily absented himself. Defendant has not adequately distinguished 
any of them. 
B. Wanosik effectively mandates that the State make extensive investigational 
inquiries whenever a defendant fails to appear. 
Defendant argues that "Wanosik does not mandate" that the State contact law 
enforcement agencies, local hospitals, the defendant's employer, pretrial services, and 
bail bond companies and attempt to contact an absent defendant at his residence or other 
places he is known to frequent. Br. Respondent at 16. Rather, defendant argues, Wanosik 
merely "provides [a] list of practical suggestions to prosecutors who hope to proceed with 
a sentencing in absentia when a defendant does not appear." Id. 
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True, the Wanosik decision does not "definitively prescribe what the State must do 
to meet its preliminary burden [to establish voluntariness]," but its suggested "avenues for 
establishing voluntariness" leave prosecutors with little choice but to follow each and 
every suggested route. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 41, f 23,31 P.3d 615. Unless the 
State has investigated all suggested "avenues," it cannot ascertain that it has met the 
"preliminary burden" that Wanosik requires. The list is thus more than a series of 
practical suggestions. It is the benchmark against which the State's efforts will be judged. 
Future defendants will undoubtedly point to every possibility on the list not pursued by 
the prosecution. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LB. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT HE DID NOT KNOWINGLY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO PRESENCE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT 
A. This issue was not raised in the State's certiorari petition and is not fairly 
included therein. 
Defendant argues that his absence was not knowing. Br. Respondent at 21-26. 
Defendant argues that "[i]n order to knowingly waive the right to presence, the record 
must establish not only that [he] knew the date of his sentencing hearing, but also that he 
knew the sentencing would proceed even if he were not present." Id. at 22. In other 
words, defendant argues that the trial court should have warned him that sentencing 
would proceed in his absence. See id. 
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The court of appeals rejected defendant's argument below. Wanosik, 2001 UT 
App 241, Y| 11-16. The court of appeals concluded, "We see no error in the trial court's 
failure to specifically warn [defendant] that sentencing would proceed in the event of his 
voluntary absence from the proceeding." Id. at f 16. The Defendant filed no petition or 
cross-petition for certiorari review. This issue was not raised in the State's petition and is 
not fairly included therein. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4); see also Coulter & Smith, Ltd. 
v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (review limited to issues raised in petitions or 
fairly included therein). Thus, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court. 
B. No Utah precedent requires that a defendant be warned that he will be 
sentenced if he fails to appear. 
In any event, the claim lacks merit. Defendant cites no Utah precedent for his 
claim; and the State has discovered none. Utah's sentencing-in-absentia rule states: "On 
the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may 
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). The 
trial-in-absentia rule states: "The defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after 
notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a 
verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present; " Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, sentencing may 
proceed where a defendant has been given notice of the sentencing proceeding, but 
voluntarily absents himself. The rule requires no warning. Further, defendant has cited 
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no Utah trial-in-absentia or sentencing-in-absentia case that requires a warning, and the 
State has located none. 
Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's knowing and 
voluntary absence waives his right to presence, even where the defendant has received no 
warning that proceedings will continue in his absence. See Taylor v. United, 414 U.S. 17, 
20 (1973) (a trial-in-absentia case (a) holding that in-absentia proceeding deprived 
voluntarily absent defendant of no constitutional right and (b) expressly rejecting the 
warning requirement imposed by United States v. McPherson, All F.2d 1127,1130 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969), a sentencing-in-absentia case). 
Defendant here had notice. His absence was therefore knowing, even though the 
court did not expressly warn him that sentencing could proceed in his absence. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I.C. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
HAVE WEIGHED THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PROCEEDING 
AGAINST DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN BEING PRESENT IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
A. This issue was not raised in the State's certiorari petition and is not fairly 
included therein. 
Defendant argues that this Court should exercise "its supervisory power to require 
trial courts to weigh the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in 
being present before allowing a defendant to be sentenced in absentia" Br. Respondent 
at 27. Defendant thereby asks this Court to address a claim rejected by the court of 
appeals and not raised in the State's petition for certiorari review. See Wanosik, 2001 UT 
6 
App 241, ^J 17-18. Further, this claim is not fairly included in any issue raised in the 
State's petition and is therefore not properly before this Court. 
B. No Utah precedent requires that the trial courts weigh the public interest in 
proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present before allowing a 
defendant to be sentenced in absentia. 
In any event, this claim also lacks merit. Defendant points to no Utah law 
requiring the trial court to balance the public interest in proceeding against the 
defendant's interest in being present before sentencing a voluntarily absent defendant in 
absentia. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governing in-absentia proceedings, rules 
17(a)(2) and 22(b), do not require a balancing. Neither do any of the Utah cases 
addressing in-absentia proceedings. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I.D. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE SENTENCING IN 
ABSENTIA WAS HARMFUL IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT 
A. This issue was not raised in the State's certiorari petition and is not fairly 
included therein. 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals "employed an incorrect analysis in 
assessing harm." Br. Respondent at 30 n.7. In other words, defendant argues that the 
court of appeals properly determined that his absence was involuntary, but improperly 
determined that sentencing him in absentia was harmless. The court of appeals decided 
the harm issue against defendant. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 26. The State did 
not raise this issue in its petition for certiorari review. Neither is this issue fairly included 
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within any issue raised by the State, including the issue of voluntariness. This issue is 
therefore not properly before this Court. 
B. Any error in conducting sentencing without further inquiry into the reasons 
for defendant's absence was harmless. 
Conducting sentencing without further inquiry into the reasons for defendant's 
absence was, if error, harmless. The question here is whether defendant was deprived of 
his right to be present at sentencing. Defendant was only deprived of that right if his 
absence was, in fact, involuntary. Defendant, however, offered record testimony that his 
absence was voluntary. After he was finally apprehended, he wrote a letter to the trial 
judge acknowledging, "I do not have a legitimate excuse" for not appearing for 
sentencing. R. 66 (emphasis in original). Because defendant was voluntarily absent, the 
trial court deprived defendant of no right by proceeding to sentencing. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II.B. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVIEWED THE 
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 22(a) PURSUANT TO RULE 22(e) 
A. This issue is fairly included in the State's challenge to the court of appeals9 
decision that the trial court had violated rule 22(a). 
In its petition for certiorari review, the State challenged the court of appeals' 
decision that the trial court had violated rule 22(a). The State argued below that 
defendant had not preserved this issue and had not demonstrated plain error. To reach 
this issue, the court of appeals held that a violation of rule 22(a) would constitute an 
illegal sentence under rule 22(e). See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 28 n.l 1. This issue 
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is therefore fairly included in the State's challenge to the court of appeals' disposition of 
the rule 22(a) issue. 
B. Defendant's sentence was neither "illegal" nor "imposed in an illegal 
manner." 
The court of appeals held that the trial court violated rule 22(a) by imposing 
sentence without affirmatively soliciting input from defense counsel and the prosecutor. 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 32. In its opening brief, the State argued that this kind of 
error, assuming error occurred, does not make a sentence illegal. Br. Petitioner at 20-27. 
Defendant countered by arguing that this sentence, even if not illegal, was a sentence 
"imposed in an illegal manner" under rule 22(e).1 Br. Respondent at 38. 
Defendant thus argues that a sentence is illegally imposed where the sentencing 
proceeding violates the procedural requirements of rule 22(a). Specifically, if the trial 
court imposes sentence without inviting defense counsel and the prosecutor to offer 
mitigating information, defendant argues, that sentence is illegally imposed. The logical 
extension of defendant's argument is that any procedural error at sentencing would cause 
the sentence to be one "imposed in an illegal manner," correctable at any time. Such a 
reading would effectively eviscerate preservation requirements at sentencing. 
defendant also argues that the State has misread State v. Wareham, 801 P.2d 918 
(Utah 1990). Br. Respondent at 41. The State agrees that it has misread Wareham and that 
Wareham involved an attack on a conviction and was, for that reason, not subject to rule 
22(e) analysis. The State therefore concedes that Wareham is not dispositive on this issue. 
The State does not, however, concede that rule 22(a) error is correctable at any time under 
rule 22(e). 
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This Court has not definitively addressed the difference, if any, between "an illegal 
sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner." This Court had held, however, 
that the purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of "manifestly illegal sentences." 
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, If 5,48 P.3d 228. Further, this Court has held that "rule 
22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for bringing a notice of appeal." Id. "Nor 
are they waived by failure to raise them at the first opportunity before the district court." 
Id. "For this reason, rule 22(e) claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse." 
Id. 
As argued in the State's brief of petitioner, an illegal sentence is a sentence that 
does not conform to the crime. Br. Petitioner at 21-22. In other words, rule 22(e) 
bestows continuing jurisdiction to correct a sentence that is more harsh or more lenient 
than that statutorily specified for the convicted offense. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 87 
(Utah 1991). It does not create continuing jurisdiction to address all error that may arise 
out of a sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041,1043 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1994) (rule 22(e) did not create jurisdiction to amend a sentence after Parker's 
conviction was overturned because the sentence was legal when imposed). 
Given the narrow construction this Court has given to "illegal sentence," a 
sentence "imposed in an illegal manner" cannot mean, as defendant assumes, continuing 
jurisdiction to address any procedural error at sentencing. A construction that broad 
would swallow up the limitation in the Court's cases defining "illegal sentence." 
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Rather, rule 22(e) "allowfs] correction of manifestly illegal sentences." Telford, 
2002 UT 51, f 5. Likewise, rule 22(e) allows correction of sentences imposed in a 
manifestly illegal manner. A court does not impose sentence in a manifestly illegal 
manner, however, just because a procedural error occurs during the sentencing 
proceeding.2 
In this case, had defendant been present and had he asked to address the court, 
denial of his rule 22(a) allocution right would have been error. See State v. Young, 853 
P.2d 327, 370 (Durham, J.), 417 (Zimmerman, J.), 418 (Stewart, J.) (Utah 1993) 
(defendant has statutory right to make a statement prior to sentencing). Whether that 
error would have made his sentence one "imposed in an illegal manner" is not clear. No 
Utah precedent suggests that it would. But, even assuming that to impose sentence while 
2The State could find no case from this Court specifically defining what rule 22(e) 
means by a sentence "imposed in an illegal manner." The State therefore does not attempt 
to propose an exhaustive list of circumstances in which a sentence may be imposed "in an 
illegal manner." It is clear, however, that the circumstances in which a sentence could be so 
characterized are few. It could be argued, for example, that a sentence that conforms to the 
crime, but is imposed by a court without jurisdiction, is a sentence imposed in a manifestly 
illegal manner. Cf. State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, J 5 n.l ("rule 22(e) may be employed to 
correct a sentence under circumstances where the sentencing court had no jurisdiction, or to 
correct a sentence beyond the authorized statutory range"). 
Further, while the terminology "imposed in an illegal manner" is used in the rules and 
statutes of other jurisdictions, precedent from those jurisdictions should be viewed with 
caution. In most jurisdictions, sentences imposed in an illegal manner are reviewable only 
within a limited period after the sentence is imposed. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 6-90-111 
(West 2001) (ninety days); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-31-1 (West 2002) (one year). Where 
illegally imposed sentences are correctable at any time, as they are in Utah, categorizing a 
sentence as illegally imposed implicates different policy considerations. 
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denying a defendant his statutory right to allocution is to impose sentence in a manifestly 
illegal manner, the error here is twice removed. First, no request was made. This case 
does not involve the denial of a request or the refusal to hear from any party. Second, 
defendant was not present and, by his absence, had waived his right to allocution. See 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 ("The right to allocution is nowhere specifically 
granted in either the state or the federal constitution. It is an inseparable part of the right 
to be present, which defendant waived by his voluntary absence."). To impose sentence 
without affirmatively soliciting input from defense counsel is not to impose sentence in a 
manifestly illegal manner. The court of appeals therefore erred in holding that rule 22(e) 
"obviate[d] the need for [defendant] to show plain error in asserting" his rule 22(a) 
claim.3 See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, % 28 n.ll; cf. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 
3The court of appeals' broad reading of the reach of rule 22(e) is consistent with that 
court's trend, evidenced by a number of its decisions over the past decade, to extend the 
reach of rule 22(e). In extending the ambit of rule 22(e), however, the court has failed to 
examine the ramifications of a broad reading of the rule: 
In State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App.1991), the court of appeals 
implicitly held that a trial court's failure to order that a defendant be mentally 
examined prior to sentencing could constitute rule 22(e) error. 
In State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that the 
defendant's claim that he had been improperly denied the return of fees did not 
constitute a rule 22(e) error. Unfortunately, in defining an "illegal sentence," 
the court cited habeas corpus cases addressing Shondel, equal protection, and 
due process challenges. 
In State v. Finlayson, 957 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1998), the court erroneously 
held that rule 22(e) permitted review of the defendant's merger claim. See 
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8,994 P.2d 1243. 
In State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 975 P.2d 476, the court properly 
reviewed defendant's preserved claim that his sentencing violated double 
12 
f 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (holding that^ourt of appeals decision to review a merger claim under 
rule 22(e) was error). 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II.C.l. 
KELBACH HAS NOT BEEN OVERRULED NOR IS ITS RULING 
UNDERMINED BY DEFENDANT'S CITED CASES 
In its opening brief, the State argued that this Court has held that "[t]he failure of 
the trial court to ask a defendant, represented by an attorney, whether he has anything to 
say before sentence is imposed (allocution), does not in itself constitute constitutional 
error." Brief Petitioner at 16, 28 (quoting State v. Kelbach, 461 P.2d 297, 299 (Utah 
jeopardy. The court suggested in dicta, however, that absent preservation the 
issue would be reviewable pursuant to rule 22(e). Id. at f 6 n. 1. 
• In State v. Burr, 2000 UT App 288 (unpublished opinion) (attached in 
Addendum B), the court addressed the defendant's rule 22 claim that his 
"sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because he was not personally 
provided with a copy of the presentence report/' Id. at f 2. While the court 
rejected the claim on the merits, it did not question the propriety of the rule 
22(e) route to review. 
In State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (unpublished opinion) (attached in Addendum 
B), the court of appeals attempted to distinguish between illegal sentences and sentences 
imposed in an illegal manner. In so doing, the court cited foreign authority suggesting that 
sentences imposed in an illegal manner are "those that are within statutory and jurisdictional 
limits, but violate a defendant's rights." Id. at f 2 & n.2. Five of the six cases cited by the 
Headley court as authority for an expansive reading of "sentences imposed in an illegal 
manner" come from jurisdictions where that expansive reading is tempered by rules that 
permit sentences imposed in an illegal manner to be reviewed only within a limited period 
after the sentence is imposed or affirmed. See United States . v Katzin, 824 F.2d. 234, 237 
(3rd Cir. 1987) (120 days); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293,299 
n.3 (3rd Cir. [V.I.] 2001) (120 days); State v. Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 477,479 (S.D. 1996) (120 
days); State v. Anderson, 661 P.2d 716, 720 (Haw. App. 1983) (90 days); State v. Brooks, 
589 A.2d 444, 446 (Me. 1991) (one year). 
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1969), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 935 (1972)). The State noted in its 
opening brief that Kelbach had been vacated in part on other grounds. 
In response, defendant argues that Kelbach has been overruled. Br. Respondent at 
45. Defendant is mistaken. As in dozens of other cases decided the same day, the United 
States Supreme Court vacated the Kelbach judgment, "insofar as it [left] undisturbed the 
death penalty imposed." Kelbach v. Utah, 408 U.S. 935 (1972). The Supreme Court 
cited to Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972), which in turn cited to Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). While nine separate opinions were filed in Furman, the 
majority apparently held "that the death penalty, as customarily prescribed and 
implemented in this country [at the time of the decision], offendfed] the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments," 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., 
dissenting and summarizing the judgment of the majority). None of the opinions, 
however, questioned the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court on the point for which the 
State has cited Kelbach. 
Defendant further argues that the continuing validity of Kelbach is undermined by 
"[t]he more recent decisions of Anderson, Johnson, Howell, Lipsky, and Young." Br. 
Respondent at 45. Defendant cites to no language in these opinions undermining 
Kelbach, and the State has discovered none. 
Finally, defendant argues that the holding in Kelbach is inconsistent with the state 
constitutional "due process protections at sentencing embraced in Johnson, Howell, and 
14 
Lipsky." Br. Respondent at 46. Again, defendant cites to no language in these opinions 
undermining Kelbach, and the State has discovered none. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT ILC.2. 
A REVIEWING COURT MUST PRESUME THAT A TRIAL COURT 
CONSIDERED ALL RELEVANT RECORD EVIDENCE AT 
SENTENCING 
Defendant argues that the trial court's deviation from the PSI recommendation 
demonstrates that the court failed to consider the information in the PSI. Br. Respondent 
at 46-47. Defendant apparently concludes that the trial court had some duty to explain 
why it imposed a sentence different from the sentence recommended and that failure to 
explain the reasons for its sentence is evidence that the trial court did not consider that 
information. Defendant points to no precedent suggesting that the trial court had a duty to 
explain why its sentence differed from that recommended by the PSI investigator. 
In its opening brief, the State detailed a number of factors the trial court may have 
considered in imposing a sentence harsher than that recommended by the PSI. See Br. 
Petitioner at 29-30. The trial court had before it record evidence that defendant was 
wanted on an outstanding warrant when arrested, that he was carrying methamphetamine 
and five knivca when arrested, that he had been untruthful about his drug abuse history, 
and that he had an earlier retail theft conviction that "was sent to warrants six times." 
R. 6-7, 52:2,4,9,10. 
Absent evidence to the contrary, an appellate court must presume that the trial 
court considered all relevant record evidence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 11,439 
15 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ("we will not assume that the trial court's silence, by itself, 
presupposes that the court did not consider the proper [sentencing] factors as required by 
law"); State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978) (stating that it must be presumed that 
the court used a court-ordered report as statute contemplated); State v. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997) (affirming consecutive sentences where "defendant [did] 
not show that the trial court failed to consider [statutory] factors"). 
The presumption that the trial court acted properly accords with case law requiring 
an appellant to support an allegation of error with record evidence. "Absent that record, 
defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which the review court 
has no power to determine." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289,293 (Utah 1982). A 
reviewing court "simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon 
alleged facts unsupported by the record." Id. 
Defendant has pointed to no record evidence demonstrating that the trial court 
failed to consider any relevant information. This Court must therefore presume that the 
trial court considered the information relevant to sentencing. Further, as defendant has 
pointed to no unreliable or irrelevant information upon which sentencing was based, this 
Court must presume that the sentencing decision was based only on relevant and reliable 
information. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Jg_ October 2002. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the nght to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The 
defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his 
absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial 
after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include 
tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant at 
the trial. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, 
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to 
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise 
be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's 
arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter 
a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following 
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time 
within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the 
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance with 
Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed 
to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
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Addendum B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Thomas C Headley, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 990462-CA 
F I L E D 
February 28, 2002 
jl 2002 UT App 58 || 
Third District Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Tyrone Medley 
Attorneys: 
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure He contends the district court erred in ruling that his motion did 
"not attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed " Headley's 
contention is two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the sentencing court 
relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false. We affirm. 
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal question that we review for correctness, see State v Brooks, 908 
P 2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. Patience. 944 P 2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct. App 1997), and we can affirm 
the decision "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." State v Finlayson, 2000 
UT 10J31, 994 P 2d 1243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing when a 
sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R Crim P 22(e). The definition of an "illegal sentence" 
has been construed narrowly to include only sentences "where the sentence does not conform to the crime of 
which the defendant has been convicted *<1) State v Parker. 872 P 2d 1041,1043 n 2 (Utah Ct App 1994) Utah 
law has no comprehensive definitionof sentences "imposed in an illegal manner", however, the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing.[2) See Kuehnert v Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P 2d 839, 841 
(1975) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at sentencing, was 
http://courtlink.utcourts.ROv/opimons/mds/headlevhtm in in ">nm 
not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his 
Sixth Amendment rights) In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at 
sentencing is necessary 
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in 
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the 
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its administration and enforcement 
of penal laws 
ld_ at 840-41 4) 
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of his Sixth 
Amendment nght To support his claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows (1) he asserts that his 
challenge to misinformation in the presentence investigation report was rejected by the sentencing court because 
it was poorly handled by sentencing counsel, (2) he challenges several factual statements contained in the 
presentence investigation report, (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused him of being involved in incest 
when that information was not otherwise before the court", and (4) he asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel 
convinced a witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]" Each of these four 
assertions has some connection with the presentence investigation report, which is not in the record on appeal 
Further, no other information in the record supports these assertions Accordingly, as discussed below, we are 
unable to address them 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without objection by his 
counsel We find no mention of a $10,000 fine in the record The only fines mentioned in the sentencing context, a 
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are 
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three days later. Finally, Headley alleges that "his 
counsel intentionally tned to prevent him from pursuing an appeal." However, the record reflects that Headley filed 
a notice of appeal on September 24,1992, but voluntary moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a motion to 
withdraw his plea of guilty" Headley's motion was granted on October 8,1992, and the record contains no 
indication of subsequent attempts to appeal the case. 
Without the presentence report or other information which may or may not be in the sentencing court record, the 
record submitted to us is inadequate for our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim All we have are 
Headley's unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct. As we have stated, 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of 
supporting such allegation by an adequate record Absent that record, a defendant's assignment of 
error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine [An 
appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record Consequently, in the face of an [inadequate record on appeal, [we] 
must assume the regulanty of the proceedings below 
State_y__Penman, 964 P 2d 1157,1162 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original), 
see also State v Lithertand. 2000 UT 76,f 17,12 P 3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, 
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively.") Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment claim. 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was biased because it relied on information in the presentence report 
that the court knew was false Utah Code Ann § 77-18-1 (6) (Supp 2001) gives a sentencing judge discretion in 
evaluating information in a presentence report and requires the judge to "make a determination of relevance and 
accuracy on the record " Here, the sentencing judge made a determination of the relevance and accuracy of the 
presentence report, deciding the presentence report was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating that those 
working on elements of the presentence report "do a pretty good job" The sentencing court has broad discretion 
to resolve factual disputes for or against a defendant, see id . and we cannot say the court exceeded its discretion 
in making this determination Further, without the presentence report, the record is inadequate and "'[we] must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below m Penman. 964 P 2d at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in 
original) 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
William A. Thome Jr., Judge 
GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but would affirm on what I perceive to be a more straightforward 
basis. As stated by the majority, the trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion because the motion did "not 
attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed." The trial court 
was correct. 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing judge are 
simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e). Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding otherwise and has also not 
offered any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case. See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on [cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was 
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial court properly resolved factual disputes presented to it. 
Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an illegal 
manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis, I would affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Nonconforming sentences include those where the sentence exceeds the statutory limits. See, e.g.. State v. 
Hiqginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because statute only 
authorized one year enhancement and the court enhanced sentence by two years); State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 
381, 388 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded statutory term). 
Nonconforming sentences also occur when the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence. See, e.g.. State 
v. Hurst. 777 P.2d 1029,1036 n.6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sentences can be attacked when beyond the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court); State v. Arviso. 1999 UT App 381 ,H1f5-8, 993 P.2d 894 (stating that the 
sentence was illegal because Supremacy Clause deprived sentencing court of jurisdiction); State v. Grate. 947 
P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the sentence was illegal because court did not have 
jurisdiction to revoke probation). 
2. Other jurisdictions have defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and 
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights, see, e.g.. Government of the V.I, v. Martinez. 239 F.3d 293, 
299 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2001); State v. McNeills, 546 A.2d 292, 305-06 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Sieler. 554 
N.W.2d 447, 479 (S.D. 1996); cf State v. Anderson. 661 P.2d 716, 720-24 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Brooks. 
589 A.2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991); or that are based on erroneous information. See, e.g.. United States v. Katzin, 
http ://courtlink. utcourts. go v/opinions/mds/headley .htm in/mnAm 
824 F 2d 234 238 (3rd Cir 1987) 
3 Kuehnert, which discusses illegal sentences under the rules in force prior to Rule 22(e), was not cited in the 
parties' briefs 
4 See also McConnell v Rh_ay, 393 US 2, 4, 89 S Ct 32, 33-34 (1968) ("As we said in Mem&a[ vJRhay, 389 
US 128 135, 88 S Ct 254, 257 (1967)],'the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing 
evidence of mitigating circumstancesf,] and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to 
sentence is apparent' The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at 
other stages of adjudication " (Citation omitted.)). 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert C. Burr, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000336-CA 
F I L E D 
October 19, 2000 
2000 UT App 288 
Second District, Ogden Department 
The Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan 
Attorneys: 
Robert C. Burr, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
L. Dean Saunders, Ogden, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM-
Appellant Robert C. Burr appeals the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 22 of the Utah 
Rules of Cnminal Procedure. This case is before the court on the State's motion for summary affirmance. 
The sentence imposed was within statutory limits; however, Burr contends the sentence was imposed in an illegal 
manner because he was not personally provided with a copy of the presentence report. The sentencing transcript 
reflects that the tnal court confirmed that defense counsel had the opportunity to review the presentence report 
The trial judge also asked Burr whether he understood the sentencing recommendation made in the report, and 
Burr responded in the affirmative. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(bXO (1999) states that "the court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his attorney shall 
be provided with" the written presentence report. (Emphasis added ) Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6)(a) 
(1999) states, in part, that "[t]he department shall provide the presentence report to the defendant's attorney, or 
the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review three working days prior to 
sentencing." (Emphasis added); see also Neelv Holden. 886 P 2d 1097,1102 n 4 (Utah 1996) (stating section 
77-18-1 (6)(a) requires that "the defendant or the defendant's attorney be provided, prior to sentencing, with a 
http://courthnk.utcourts.20v/ooinions/mdq/h11rrhtm 
written presentence report") Burr cites no authority for his claim that the court must affirmatively determine 
whether a defendant who is represented by counsel has personally received or actually reviewed the report Burr 
failed to establish that his sentence was either illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, and the trial court did not 
err in denying the motion. 
The State also argues that Burr failed to timely move to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 
(1999). Burr did not file any motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court, and the issue is not properly before 
this court on appeal. The request to withdraw the guilty plea was based solely upon the Rule 22(e) motion. See 
State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381
 fffl[9-11. 993 p - 2 d 8 9 4 (holding guilty plea may be withdrawn in the limited 
circumstance where plea bargain contemplated a particular sentence subsequently determined to be illegal). 
Having determined that the sentence was not illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, there is no basis from which 
to conclude that Burr should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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